Just 60 MMS inspectors oversaw rigs in the gulf. They examined oil spill response plans that were often boilerplate reproductions from one well to another. BP's response plan for the gulf referenced seals and walruses , which aren't found in that body of water, referred to a home-shopping network in Japan and listed scientists who were dead. No one noticed. The inspectors, Ruch says," just made sure the companies checked the right boxes." Since much of the drilling data necessary to complete environmental reviews was proprietary, MMS scientists were not allowed access to exploration and drilling details . when BP made repeated last- minute changes to its drilling plan in the days before the blowout, the MMS approved them all, often within minutes. "That's what happens," Ruch says, "when the government is dependent upon industry for its expertise."
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- Public Discussion (22)
During the Challenger accident investigation, the physicist Richard Feynman asked NASA for its failure rate. The answer: one in 100,000. Feynman was incredulous, pointing out that this meant a shuttle launch every day for 300 years with only a single mishap, when the demonstrated failure rate was between one in 25 and one in 60. "NASA's figures were totally baseless," McDonald says, "and were just backed into as a number that was acceptable to Congress."
McDonald, who is the former director of Morton-Thiokol's space shuttle solid-rocket-motor project, says that the company's engineers knew there was a problem with the shuttle boosters' O-rings. The seals, which kept blistering gases from escaping the motors, could turn brittle and leak in temperatures below 53 degrees Fahrenheit. On the morning of Jan. 28, 1986, the temperature in Cape Canaveral was 36 degrees.
But the company managers pressed forward—the mission had already been postponed six times because of weather and mechanical problems—and engineers were left having to prove the components would fail. "It's a trap," McDonald says. "Is it safe enough to fly? is the correct question, not that you have to prove it will fail. If you can't prove that it will fail, then there will be zero failure rate!" If a system never fails, he explains, then why bother spending time and money on safety? That inversion of logic "changes the burden of proof, and that is a fatal mistake." Thiokol's engineers ultimately relented. The shuttle broke apart 73 seconds after launch.
- 5 votes
Normalization of Deviance
At the root of BP's choices was what Bea calls the normalization of deviance. The company had long grown used to operating at the margins of safety. It regarded red flags as normal, and those red flags cropped up repeatedly on the Macondo well, with the frequency accelerating in the four days before the blowout.
- 6 votes
The well was scheduled for 78 days at a cost of $96 million, but the real target was 51 days. BP urged speed. Mike williams, Transocean's chief electronics technician, told CBS's 60 Minutes that he heard a BP manager saying, "Let's bump it up, let's bump it up." But in early March that increased drilling speed fractured the well, forcing workers to backtrack 2000 feet from the then-13,000-foot hole, plug the cracked section with cement, and carve a new path to the hydrocarbon-bearing formation, or pay zone. "Operations were faster and cheaper," Bea says, "but not better—the operation records clearly show excessive economic and schedule pressures resulting in compromises in quality and reliability."
Means 1.23 million USD per day. DWH's cost per day is 500,000 USD/day.
- 4 votes
How horribly ironic. It is the humans of engineering brilliance who develop the technology to drill this deep, but as soon as non-technical managers take control, they ignore the profoundly important advice of the engineers that made the whole thing possible.
It seems to Loozerio that this falls into the more general context of right wing negation of science. Is it envy that causes the mediocre minds of the right wing to belittle science? Do these mediocre minds, being of wealth and power by being ruthless bean-counters, use that higher socio-economic rank to punish the brilliant minds? Just asking.
- 6 votes
Loozerio
We have the technology but not the responsibility to do it right. Thanks for your comments.
- 4 votes
Did the engineers have to sign off on the plans or did management just make the decisions and the engineers carry them out. Engineering ethic's main requirement is "To protect the public" while management is concerned with politics and making money.
In the case of the Challenger, the decision whether to launch was the responsibility of Bob Lund, the vice president of engineering for Morton Thiokol. On the advice of his engineers, he recommended against the launch.
However, Jerald Mason, the general manager of Morton Thiokol, called a meeting to discuss the decision. He asked Bob Lund to "Take off your engineering hat and put on your management hat." He was asking Lund, in effect, to put aside his engineering ethics and weigh the very unlikely possibility of an accident against the public relations benefits of launching on schedule. Apparently, that argument worked as Lund approved the launch, despite the fact that the predicted launch temperature was outside of the operational specifications. At 59 seconds into the launch, the O-rings failed and the rocket exploded, plunging the Challenger into the ocean and killing all seven astronauts. It was the worst disaster in the U.S. space program's history and it was ultimately a result of a failure of ethics.
Managers who cause disasters by overriding engineer's decisions or engineers who let them or who ignore engineering ethics should be financially and criminally liable for the disaster. However, in the Challenger disaster, the one who suffered the most was the whistle-blower who not only adamantly recommended against the launch but told the truth about the errors, not on the ones who made the errors.
- 7 votes
Que
When the bottom line counts, managers shed off their professionalism and do the bidding of their paymaster. Good Independent professionals in every industry are being removed to be replaced by subservient ones.
- 5 votes
BK
You want to know how it happened? See the Totally Obfuscated Dumpsite (TOD) at my column.
- 4 votes
Hey Jay
Where did you get this gem? This is totally hilarious. Have to clip to my column for everyone to see. Great thanks.
- 4 votes
one of your article, the bathy charts is down........... did you take it down?
isthere new info?
curious.
- 1 vote
Freebird
You are very sharp. Took down for maintenance/check work on the bathy chart. Self explanatory.
- 2 votes
The seven quotes from the article shown below brings into sharp focus just how complacent MMS had become to their own procedures and regulations. It also shows BPs total disregard for safety not only for the rig but the public and environment as well.
1. The Deepwater Horizon disaster resulted from many human and technical failings in a risk-taking corporation that operated in an industry with ineffective regulatory oversight.
2. Robert Bea, an engineering professor at the university of California–Berkeley. "It was a chain of important errors made by people in critical situations involving complex technological and organization systems."
3. In fact, neither BP nor any of its competitors had "proven equipment or technology" or any backup plan for a catastrophic failure at great depth.
4. Robert Bea adds: "Because BP and the MMS believed that the potential consequences were ‘insignificant,' they were not prepared for the failures associated with the Deepwater Horizon's operations, both in prevention and containment."
5. Gordon Aaker Jr., a failure analysis consultant with the firm Engineering Services, told the House committee investigating the blowout that it was "unheard of" not to perform this routine test on a single casing well. He called BP's decision to skip the cement bond log "horribly negligent."
6. Transocean documents show that when it bought this particular BOP in 2001, the company identified 260 separate ways it could fail. During a Congressional hearing, Rep. Bart Stupak, D-Mich., asked: "How can a device that has 260 failure modes be considered fail-safe?"
7. But worst of all, says Ford Brett, president of Oil and Gas Consultants International, the blowout "wasn't an accident in the traditional sense, like when someone just hits your car. It was an accident that was totally preventable."
Item #3 above is the most disturbing to me. How can the government permit these wells if the people requesting the permit can not show any plans for control and containment in the event of a deep water catastrophe?
Item #6 proves that Transocean management is educated beyond their collective intelligence and has the aggregate IQ of a stone. Would you buy a car that had 260 known failure modes then take your family for a ride? I don’t think you would, why, because you are smarter than that.
Fast forward the BOP failed (no surprises there they knew it would), the well exploded and killed 11 and injured 17, Macondo well spewed oil in excess of 400,000 barrels into the Gulf of Mexico, BP ignored the Coast Guard and sprayed over 200,000 gallons of Corexit to disperse the oil knowing that Narco the makers of Corexit in their MSDS state not to be broadcast on open water. BP funds a survey then tells the public the Gulf is safe, the fisheries are opened and the fish and shell fish are declared safe to eat. And within days the oyster beds are showing a die off of between 80 and 90%. Some one pass me the shrimp (not). Roflmao
The irony is item #7 this whole fiasco didn't have to happen!!!!!
- 5 votes
Larry
Thank you so much for an itemised highlights of that long report. It is useful for those who do not have time to read long documents and for those who are trying to keep the story straight. BP's shills are overloading and distorting information in the hope that people are so fed-up that they give up.
- 4 votes
Yes, thanks. There is so much information out there and it is nice to get a summary of it.
- 4 votes
My answer to some questions posted to me on the email. Though I post here for the benefit of others.
A well was drilled by BP and abandoned, [is there or was there a rig over the hole?]
Yes for a well to be drilled, a semi-submersible rig had to be positioned over the location, within tolerance limit of say 1 to 5% of the depth to the seabed.
- 5 votes
BP moved to another location and drilled a second hole. The rig blew up on April 20th, and started a huge leak.
See summary at which-well-are-they-killing?
BP drilled the official well A on 3 Feb and abandoned it 10 days later on 13 Feb due to the drilling pipe stuck at the bottom of the well at about 5000 ft The last 1000 ft had not been cased yet thus making it possible for the Formation (rocks and soil in simple terms) to collapse into the hole.
Since BP could not continue, BP went to drill at Well B without informing MMS. That is a violation of the law.
BP started drilling at Well B probably from 17 Feb onwards.
Again they had numerous problems, a Hell Hole as they called it, but still struggled on (pressured by BP) till 13,100 ft where they "damn nearly blew the well". BP had no choice but to move to a new location. This time they were given permission to "side track" or drill from the same seabed location with the well-bore redirected at an angle away from the problem section. Did BP do that?
No, they moved to a new location without official permission again. This is again in violation of the law.
BP started drilling on the 3rd (unapproved seabed location) from 16 March 2010 until the 20 April when the blowout occurred; one day before Tony Hawyard disposed of his shares 223,288 shares. see link at A-pattern-of-massive-shares-sell-off-by-bp-directors-prior-to-expected-disasters
Their formal application for the new (third hole) was only applied 4 days before the 20th April blowout, a month after they had drilled at the 3rd hole. This is again a violation of the law. And MMS approved the application the same day it was filed retrospectively without any stern warning/fine. If this not cozy relationship, then what is?
- 5 votes
BP fixed the hole that started leaking on April 20th. The fix was in August.
BP did not fix the 3rd hole that blew up on 20th April; the only well that reached down to reservoir at 18,303 ft bml.
The problems appeared too big for a quick fix. So they moved the fallen BOP to Well A which was also leaking.
Then they pretended that Well A was the well they had drilled all the time. All information on the 3rd hole (S20BC) were blacked out.
This is the reason why there are so much oil in the water. So BP used a lot more Corexit than necessary to disperse and hide the real spill on the third open and damaged well (S20BC).
- 5 votes
The first hole blew open and has been also leaking since April 20th, but it is uncapped.
By the first hole, I take it you mean Well A. Yes it was probably leaking already in Feb since it had not been properly capped when BP abandoned it on 13 FEb.
The 3rd hole (S20BC) remains uncapped because there is no way to cap a badly damaged well in a blown crater.
- 5 votes
The second hole could not be fixed until the first hole vented so much material that the pressure dropped.
The 2nd hole (Well B) was probably plugged (although not to specifications, >750 ft above the depth drilled, but suspected to be more) before it was abandoned. Chances are it is probably was not leaking. But I cannot be sure. BP had not given out much data on this.
I suspect the relief wells were mean to kill the open gusher (3rd hole, S20BC) but BP is now hesitating even though Relief Well C is less than 5 ft from the gushing well. BP had hoped that the gushing well had depleted itself by 3 months but apparent by hesitating, I suspect the oil is still gushing as strongly as ever. It would have been too dangerous to attempt a bottom kill at the moment.
- 5 votes
The second hole is still venting and BP will not admit it exists, nor fix it, nor can it fix it.
By the second hole - I take it to mean the 3rd well (S20BC) - yes it is still venting judging from all information at hand (which is not much).
Of course BP will not admit to this since it will mean the end of BP as we know it due to the potential civil and criminal lawsuits. If we cannot cap it maybe we should be looking at alternatives - like bleeding the reservoir using multiple wells drilled from safe (away from gas saturated weak sub-formation) GWSF hazards.
It is possible but may not be economical. It is the only way to keep the oil from spreading into the fragile upper formation and destroying the gulf over time.
- 5 votes
The Gulf is doomed.
No there is still hope. But we must act fast. The healing can only begin when the lying stops.
Otherwise all the recovery efforts will be just shadow play while the real problems lay hidden.
It is important to get a clear message to the people. Not not panic/scare tactics or confuse with conspiracy theories or over-kill scenarios.
- 5 votes
I'm concerned that BP is not finishing the relief well. What will happen if there is a hurricane in the gulf before they permanently plug it. I mean, if they can - I'm even beginning to have doubts about that. Why are they procrastinating?
- 5 votes
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