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USS San Francisco in dry dock at Apra Harbor Guam Jan 27. Tarp covers sonar dome area.
- BK Lim 20 Sept 2011 (revised 10 Oct 2011, added note 12 Oct11, added pic 14 Oct11)
The following are some of the eye-witnesses' accounts of the purported USS San Francisco grounding and head-on collision with an uncharted sea mount 360 nautical miles from its Guam base. 70 crew members were seriously injured and in urgent need of emergency medical attention. Yet no emergency Medivac chopper was dispatched immediately after the purported collision.
The big question Why?
Immediately, Mooney dispatched a message to Guam, where the Commander of Naval Forces Marianas dispatched the 110-foot, Guam-based Coast Guard cutter Galveston Island and the 906-foot Maritime Sealift Command cargo ship Gy. Sgt. Fred Stockham to intercept the submarine and escort it home, but it would be almost a day before they arrived.
By 4 p.m. Saturday, the commodore of Submarine Squadron 15 on Guam had called together family members to deliver the news and promise regular briefings on the situation. The front of the ship was so badly deformed, its maneuverability was compromised. In addition, because the bow-down aspect of the sub would force it under at even moderate speeds, the San Francisco was limited to about eight knots on the surface.
Then, poor weather on Sunday forced the captain to bring all his crewmen down from the bridge out of fear that any additional water coming down the hatch would cut further into the sub's limited buoyancy. He had to run the ship from the control room, using radar and radio to make sure it stayed close to the escort ships, but not too close.
The executive officer suffered a serious back injury when he was thrown onto an emergency air supply pipe, but he was quickly directing damage-control efforts. Injured men were carried to the crew's mess and the wardroom, where the tables were pressed into service as gurneys. The ship's “doc,” an independent duty corpsman trained in emergency medicine, began assessing and treating the injuries.
One of the ship's junior officers was a former enlisted man and was able to help out. Other crewmen were recruited to keep men with head injuries awake until they could be checked out, as the worst cuts were stitched and the worst breaks were set.
When a medical team arrived from Guam via helicopter the next morning, a surgeon, an undersea medical officer and another independent duty corpsmen remarked that the care given to the injured crewmen was outstanding, particularly considering the circumstances.
The tight quarters made it difficult to get Ashley off the boat to a helicopter that could take him to a hospital in Guam. Crewmen spent the night removing railings and lockers to clear a path to the only hatch considered safe to open.
The next morning, they threaded Ashley's stretcher through small compartments and up narrow ladders, but the bridge hatch wouldn't open far enough to let it out. Some of his shipmates cursed and cried in frustration. Cooter died without regaining consciousness, 25½ hours after the accident.
It took two days for the San Francisco to crawl back to Guam. There, the crew – and later the Ashleys – first saw the astonishing damage to the ship's outer hull.
The crew continuously operated the low-pressure blower to keep air in the ballast tanks, despite the leaks. The air pump is rated for only intermittent use, but held out for more than 30 hours during the trip back. In addition, the crew quickly implemented an emergency technique to use the exhaust from its massive auxiliary diesel engines to augment the low-pressure blower.
“Immediately, Mooney dispatched a message to Guam” meant soon after the accident at 11:43 am 8 Jan 2005; est 1230hr.
“The Commander of Naval Forces Marianas dispatched the escort vessels immediately to intercept the submarine” meant the escort vessels were dispatched an hour (at the earliest) of the accident est, 13:30 hr 8 Jan 2005. Why “Intercept”? Does it mean the commander knew the damaged submarine was already in transit (sailing) back to Guam? Is it not strange after such a major accident, a badly damaged submarine could “find its feet” again?
The USS San Francisco was televised by News Kuam 8 as arriving back to Guam at about 1500hrs 10 Jan 2005. A total of 50 hours would have elapsed from 1300hrs 8 Jan till 1500 hrs 10 Jan 2005. (Note: readers sent in a CBS report dated 11 Feb 2009, confirming “the crew of the USS San Francisco tell how they survived 52 harrowing hours at sea”.)
As the USS San Francisco limped back on its own power at 8 knots, it must have started its journey back to Guam about 5 hours after the accident (estimated departure time from crash location: 1700 hrs 8 Jan 2005). It would have to transit alone without escort for the first 13-14 hours since it would have taken the escort vessels 24 hours travelling at an assumed top speed of 15 knots to reach the crash site 360 nautical miles from Guam ie 1330 hrs 9 Jan 2005. The USS San Francisco was just 250 nautical miles from Guam when the escort vessels intercepted the beleaguered submarine already steaming towards Guam.
On the surface the official story appears credible except for one important point. Why no emergency medivac helicopter was dispatched to the crash site as soon as possible? Why was there an unexplained delay of at least 20 hours?
At 200 knots, the medical chopper could have arrived within 2 to 3 hours; at the most arrived at 1500hrs on 8 Jan 2005. The medical team might have saved Joseph Allen Ashley's life. If the escort vessels could be dispatched immediately; why not the medivac chopper? The fact that the chopper cannot be dispatched immediately is because the USS San Francisco did not actually have an accident 360 nautical miles south-east of Guam in the vicinity of the Micronesia atolls islands of West Fayu. Period.
The accident happened offshore Sumatra on 26 Dec 2004 at the same time the 2004 Quake-Tsunami was triggered. If the Medivac chopper had been dispatched to the fictitious Micronesia crash location on 8 Jan 2005, the chopper would not have been able to find any crashed submarine. The fraud accident at Micronesia would have been exposed.
If the medivac helicopter had been directed to the real transit location of the beleaguered USS San Francisco on 8 Jan 2005, the chopper crew and medical team would have realised that the submarine was actually steaming in from Indonesian waters and not from Micronesia. Besides keeping a tighter lid on the lies,it was also easier to disguise the approach direction closer to Guam.
When the shoes fit so nicely, can it still be coincidence?
When so many facts and evidences from different areas fall so neatly into place, you really have to wonder whether it is just coincidence or in fact reality. There has never been a major fraud investigations where we had not been publicly condemned before proven right. With the increasing and intense condemnation from the trolls, we know we are right on the money on this one as well.
Some simple calculations and correlation of the facts will show this to be true.
The epicentre of the 26 Dec 2004 Sumatra quake to Guam is over 2,800 nautical miles as the crow flies. At 8 knots, it would have taken the USS San Francisco about 14 ½ days to travel that distance. It is also possible that the damaged submarine could have been towed at higher speed thru some parts of the journey but these are minor details we can dispense with in the big picture. If the Sumatra Quake had occurred a bit later, say by a few days, then the epicentre of the quake could not be the location of the USS San Francisco's unfortunate accident since at 8 knots, it could not have travelled that distance.
Conversely if the quake had occurred even 1 week earlier, then the distance, speed of 8 knots and other known facts would not fit. If the submarine had been damaged beyond bootstrap repairs and not possible to make the arduous journey back, the navy high command would have ordered it sunk rather than let it fall to enemy hands in foreign territorial waters. It is not likely and prudent for the USS San Francisco to sit at the crash location any more than necessary. Thus the timing with regard to the distance travelled, speed, departure from crash site, intercept with the medivac chopper, arrival at Guam and many other details, has to be accurate to within a day.
The number of days and hours from 1058 hrs 26 Dec 2004 (Guam local time when the quake hits) till 1500hrs 10 Jan 2005 (arrival at Guam) is 15 days 4 hours.
Eye-witness statement: “The air pump is rated for only intermittent use, but held out for more than 30 hours”
One of the crew documented that “the air pump is rated for only intermittent use, but held out for more than 30 hours during the trip back”. If the accident had really happened at Micronesia, 360 nautical miles SE of Guam, it would have taken the USS San Francisco at least 45 hours to limp back to Guam. Not only that but could the air pump rated for intermittent use, last all the way back to Guam. Further would the navy high command risk another disaster on the way back without a full external inspection and assessment of the fitness of the vessel. No, we think not. That 30 hours we suspect was the duration taken to surface and to wait for the Strike Force 5 (aka rescue team) to arrive.
Now, if you were to deduct 30 hours from that 15 days 4 hours, you get 14 days 22 hours. Isn't this a bit too close to the estimated 14 ½ days needed to transit at 8 knots over the journey from the epicentre of the quake to Guam, give take some 10 to 20 hours for emergency repairs, welding and bootstrap reinforcement to the outer hull to make sure the submarine last the long journey home.
If you look closely at figure 164-3 (Part-2) and the video of the USS San Francisco coming in to port, you should be able to notice the external contraptions used for reinforcement. Only after much needed bootstrap repair work had been done was the submarine allowed to transit back to Guam escorted. The USS San Francisco otherwise could not have lasted the long punishing journey back to Guam. But the most telling part of the lie had been the cover-up. No amount of spin could cover the arduous long journey back to Guam. Superficially yes. Scratch a little and the slips show.
The 2003 Bam earthquake was a major earthquake that struck Bam and the surrounding Kerman province of southeastern Iran at 1:56AM UTC (5:26AM Iran Standard Time) on Friday, December 26, 2003. The most widely accepted estimate for the magnitude of the earthquake is a moment magnitude (Mw) of 6.6; estimated by the United States Geological Survey. The shallow earthquake (10 km) was particularly destructive, with the death toll amounting to 26,271 people and injuring an additional 30,000. - wikipedia.
The 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake occurred at 00:58:53 UTC (10:58:53 Guam Time) on Sunday, December 26, 2004, with an epicentre off the west coast of Sumatra, Indonesia ~ wikipedia.
The 2006 Taiwan major earthquake (1226 Taiwan) occurred 90 km (55 miles) SSE of Kao-hsiung, Taiwan and 795 km (495 miles) N of Manila, Philippines at 6:26 AM MDT, Dec 26, 2006 (8:26 PM local time in Taiwan). Depth: 10 km. USGS public info.
Notice that all 3 quakes occurred exactly on 26 Dec. Even the 2003 Bam and 2006 Taiwan quakes shared the same minute to the hour (26 minutes) and the same depth (10 km). Amazing coincidences is it not? An article is being drafted on this.
If the accident happened near Sumatra, why fake the accident at Micronesia?
There was no other choice really.
If the fake accident location was too near to Guam, it would be impossible to delay the medivac chopper arrival. It would be a shock to the medical team to find the injured crew all fully bandaged and recovering from an accident that had just occurred hours ago. There would also be hordes of newspaper reporters on their own choppers covering the accident at site.
Surely a fake accident would not work within US territories. Fake may have a chance in very remote third world country inaccessible to all. Indonesia's territorial waters would be too sensitive. Philippines with lots of islands and a government subservient to the US would be ideal. But it is too heavily populated even in remote islands and too short distances from established communication centres. An accident (albeit a fake one) would bring swarms of curious people and hordes of reporters. Besides the southern island of Mindanao is too hostile with the Abu Sayyaf terrorists and too far (1,200 nautical miles) for the 8 knot – limping submarine to spring a surprise arrival at Guam. It would need 6 ½ days transit journey to Guam. Since the accident has to be promulgated on the day of occurrence to be credible, there is simply no way the fake could succeed.
The Micronesia atolls being 300-400 miles, are the only suitable shallow zone with uncharted sea mounts to fake a shallow grounding accident. Initially they decided on the Coralline Islands. Why they later switched to south of West Fayu – Pikelot, is not clear but that is again fine details that do not interest us at the moment. They had to choose within the atolls island chains because outside the island chains, the water depths are just too deep to fake an accidental grounding. Being 2 days away from Guam fits in the scheme. Before the press could fly out to the crash site, the submarine would have already arrived at Guam's doorstep.
Once the crash location was selected, the transit times and events were worked backwards from the ETA of the USS San Francisco at Guam. The only snag was sending the medical team by chopper. Damn if they send and damn if they don't. The only way out was to delay sending the medical chopper until the beleaguered submarine was out in open waters. They could not push the date and time of the fake accident any further as the delay in sending the medical chopper needed to be as short as possible to minimise suspicion.
Could 5 hours be sufficient for the injured and probably dazed crew (more than half) to make the necessary patch-up repairs and bootstrap reinforcement without the full engineering capability of the Strike Force 5 armada? Would any responsible commander, after a terrible accident which nearly killed half his crew, add further risks to their lives by taking a submarine which had barely made it to the surface back into the unforgiving deep wide ocean. It would have been madness to leave the relatively safe enclosed shallow water for the deep waters under so much uncertainties. So what was the hurry? Why couldn't the beleaguered submarine stay in place at the crash site until help arrived?
It is not as if the submarine was in any danger of sinking, in hostile enemy waters or in open dangerous water. While they could blame the accidental grounding on stupidity, the naval commanders at base could not be so “stupid and heartless” to command a badly damaged submarine back home without escorts and without an assessment whether it could make the 360 nautical miles journey back in one piece? No sane commanders would. Thus the high speed collision and grounding at Micronesia cannot be real. The fake accident was only for public consumption.
A few more hours for the chopper and rescue/escort vessels would not have made any difference in a real collision accident. But for a fake accident, the submarine had to clear off from the purported crash location or be exposed.
On the other hand, if the accident had occurred near Aceh, there would be no “real urgency for the medical team on 8 Jan 2005” since the injured had already been treated by the medical team arriving with Strike Force 5, more than a week earlier. That is why when the medical team reached the submarine on 9 Jan 2005, the “surgeon, an undersea medical officer and another independent duty corpsmen remarked that the care given to the injured crewmen was outstanding”. They had to be. They were treated by the best medical expertise available in the US navy.
As asserted earlier, fake incident reports always focused narrowly on the “prop stage”. Most of the discrepancies and illusions become apparent once you look from the backstage; not the frontal audience view the fakers want you to see. In this case, the fakers had to build their scenario after the emergency phase had passed. The medical evacuation and chopper was not necessary. But then it would look real strange if no medical chopper team was called in such a serious major accident.
Perhaps now with the knowledge that the grounding of the USS San Francisco in the Micronesia atolls on 8 Jan 2005 had been faked to cover the more likely accident on 26 Dec 2004 in the vicinity of the 26 Dec 2004 Sumatra Quake-Tsunami, we can understand why John Howard (aka Little Johnny) acted so indifferently to the worst-hit Sri Lanka; preferring to secretly dispatch Hercules transport planes to Malaysia and Darwin complete with troops. Perhaps the Australian troopers were not so much into humanitarian rescue of the tsunami victims at Aceh but more to assist in the rescue of the beleaguered USS San Francisco if the need arose before the arrival of the US Strike Force 5 armada from their bases in Hong Kong and Guam.
On the morning of 27 December, the Australian (New York owned) media was making it very clear that the most badly hit nation in the region was Sri Lanka, an island at the southern tip of India, which like Australia is a member nation of the British Commonwealth. Accordingly, Tim Costello, head of one of Australia's largest charities, made immediate plans to fly to the area and assess the need for aid. But that same morning, Little Johnny was dancing to a very different tune, which, based on his known subservience, must have been playing down his secure telephone line from Wall Street.
In true covert manner, Little Johnny secretly dispatched two RAAF Hercules transport planes packed with supplies to Malaysia on "Stand By", and directed two more to Darwin in Australia's north. Please note that if Little Johnny had any humanitarian concerns at all, all four Hercules could have flown directly to Commonwealth partner Sri Lanka, where every other Australian had already been told by the media that aid was needed. But no, it wasn't to be, and Little Johnny waited patiently for orders from New York.
The waiting period was short, and after a high-flying reconnaissance jet confirmed that the runway was clear at Medan in eastern Sumatra, all four Australian Hercules complete with troops, guns and other tackle, invaded Sumatra just south of the devastated province of Aceh. In turn, with 90% of its population killed by the tsunami, Aceh might perhaps one day soon become Indonesia's very own Guantanamo Bay, crawling with hundreds of heavily armed Australians and Americans.
Remember carefully though, at the time these four Hercules touched down in Medan, the ordinary Australian public still had no idea that Sumatra was badly hit. Only Little Johnny knew, and of course his trusty crystal ball in New York. To hell with Sri Lanka, his bosses wanted a main base for the huge reconstruction contracts in Asia, designed to replace the failed oil theft and reconstruction in Iraq, and keep poor old Zion on its tottering New York legs for a few more weeks or months.
There must be some very important reasons to keep the real accident under cover. Could the speculation of a nuclear-triggered Quake-Tsunami weapon be one of them? Although vigorously dismissed by their trolls as absurd conspiracies dreamed up by “insane” scientists, one must wonder why senior members of the Administration were not similarly branded. If the nuclear-triggered Quake-Tsunami weapon was such a ridiculous idea, why spend so much effort to stamp it out? Let such crazy ideas die their natural deaths as had so many prophecies of doom. There must be some truth to it, if not entirely.
"Others are engaging even in an eco type of terrorism, whereby they can alter the climate, set off earthquakes or volcanos remotely, through the use of electromagnetic waves." American Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, April 1997.
Part 4 The lies and events that reveal the truth of the USS San Francisco and 2004 Quake-Tsunami.
