BP's latest twist on the DWH disaster, A Pipeline Burst?

Here's an interesting tid bit mstanley

http://www.climatesciencewatch.org/2012/01/24/peer-alleges-scientific-misconduct-at-noaa-in-lowballing-of-bp-spill-rate/

not the final report on the Macondo Blowout which had a lot more science, engineering and geological information

And more bull@!$%# than a cattle ranch!

I'll let BK address your comment.

Sounded like a water pipeline burst...no big deal until I saw this. LMAO! A Rig fire wouldn't sound so far off.

The Macondo Report from the National Academies didn't 'low ball' the blowout, one tiny little bit. Though some of the others did leave out pertinent information. I use the Macondo Report from the NA which was readily available to anyone that wanted it.

BK, first an understanding of the geology of the Gulf. The seabed floor is on fault lines which are having up to 3.00 earthquakes. Most are in the 1.00 are less.

When the drilling goes into an area that is basically unknown as to the composition of where they are drilling, it turns into a flip of the coin as to what they are drilling through.

There are worse case scenerio's and best case scenerio's. And then there are the inbetween. Oil drilling has Never been anything but dangerous both to the environment and to the drillers. Deepwell Drilling has highlighted it even more because it is in water which spreads the blowout oil faster than it did on land. Though Nigeria is a good case in point for really bad management of wells and pipelines on land.

I am not defending BP, I am merely pointing out the obvious which is that Deepwell drilling with as close to safety management as known at this point in time will procede and with most of the recommendations of the NA because the NA report addressed the science, the engineering, equipment and the geology. Not 'parts' of the whole. All of the recommendations cannot be done because there is not enough advancement in the technology of the equipment ...yet...

From the report:

"The Macondo well presented a number of technical challenges to the drilling and completion teams, including the deep water, high formation pressures, and the need to drill through multiple geologic zones of varying pore and fracture pressures. In general, many of these problems can be anticipated, but some, such as pore and fracture pressure, are difficult to estimate in advance of drilling the well."

The major flaw was in that there was a huge reliance on the BOP to shut off the drill pipe, even though there was evidence that the BOP would not clamp, adequately, a drill pipe once it was twisted.

From the report (and do note that most controls where staged needing electricity).

The BSR was designed to be capable of activation in several ways (DNV 20011a, I, 2)

By personnel on the Deepwater Horizon directly via either one of two control panels; Through the activation of the emergency disconnect system (EDS, with options EDS 1 and EDS 2) (BOEMR 2011, 133), which was to function via either of the two control panels on the rig (the EDS was meant to be triggered when the drilling rig was to come off the well in an emergency for whatever reason);

By the circuits located on either of two pods on the BOP system if the automatic mode function (AMF) was activated by loss of communications and hydraulic connection with the rig;

By the auto-shear function located on the BOP stack if the connection to the LMRP was physically broken; and

By a subsea remotely operated vehicle (ROV)"

There was also the problem with the concrete that was sent down the drill pipe, though they haven't been able to figure out what was done wrong in that area.

From the report:

"The completion approach chosen was to cement the production casing by using primarily foamed cement with a density low enough that the fracture pressure in the well was not exceeded. The placement of cement is always a potentially problematic operation, and if it is unsuccessful it can leave channels or pathways for fluid movement outside the casing. If the fracture pressure is exceeded while the cement is pumped, all or part of the cement can be lost to the fracture, greatly reducing the volume of cement available to isolate the well from high-pressure reservoirs. As explained below, foamed cement is more difficult to mix and place at the bottom of a well than is un-foamed cement. The foamed cement does not establish the strength of the base cement used to mix the foam, which can increase the potential for cement cracking. Furthermore, cementing hardware, such as the back-flow valves used in the float collar or centralizers on the outside of the casing, is subject to failure. Hardware failure can lead to flow pathways through the cement and into the casing."

Thus the hydrocarbons went up the pipe and an explosion followed, twice. The electricity was cutoff to the computers, the backup generator failed to start, the electrical cables were disabled by the explosion. Three men were in charge on the platform, time was wasted as to which one's commands were to be followed. There was no one on shore to take command.

All the check off items for safety that could go wrong, went wrong.

I have the NA report if you would like to read it but I have to email it to you and it is in the advanced ADOBE format.